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Abstract. 
 
 
It is proposed that explaining religion in evolutionary terms is a misleading enterprise 
because religion is an indissoluble part of a unique aspect of human social 
organisation. Theoretical and empirical research should focus on what differentiates 
human sociality from that of other primates. That is the fact that members of society 
often act towards each other in terms of essentialised roles and groups. These have a 
phenomenological existence that is not based on everyday empirical monitoring but 
on imagined statuses and imagined communities such as clans or nations. The 
neurological basis for this type of social, which includes religion, will therefore 
depend on the development of imagination. It is suggested that such a development of 
imagination occurred at about the time of the upper palaeolithic “revolution”. 
 
 
 
This paper reconsiders how we should approach the study of the evolution of religion. 
The discussion leads me, however, to a more general consideration of the way social 
cognition has been approached in recent literature.  This reconsideration bears in mind 
the kind of problems that Colin Renfrew has called the “sapient paradox”.   The paper 
proposes a cognitively and neurologically more probable scenario for the 
development of religion than certain recent theories that are questioned by the 
problems he highlights. 
  
 
The problems I am referring to are particularly thrown into focus by a series of 
theories that originate in Sperber’s suggestion that religious-like beliefs are to be 
accounted for by a subtle mix of intuitive human capacities based on evolved 
neurological modules, and certain, very limited, representations that, because they go 
against the core knowledge that the modules suggest, are therefore “counter-
intuitive”, therefore “intriguing” (Sperber: 1985).  The motivation for these theories is 
to seek an answer to a question. How could a sensible animal like modern Homo 
sapiens, equipped by natural selection with efficient core knowledge (or modular 
predispositions), that is knowledge well suited for dealing with the world as it is, hold 
such ridiculous ideas as: there are Ghosts that go through walls, there exist omniscient 
s and there are deceased people active after death?  The authors who hold such a 
theory of religion give the following answers to this question.  First, our core 
knowledge ensures that, however bizarre such ideas might seem at first, when they are 
more closely examined, they, in fact, turn out to be mainly disappointingly intuitive.  
Secondly, even though beliefs in supernatural things nevertheless do involve a few 
counter-intuitive aspects, if only by definition, these are possible because of 
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accidental misapplications of core knowledge to domains for which it is not designed.  
These limited misapplications are, however, so alluring that they make these 
minimally counter-intuitive beliefs spread like wildfire. They thus become key 
elements in religions (e.g. Boyer 1994: 2001, Pyysiainen: 2001). 
 
The problems with these theories that I shall discuss here do not necessarily imply 
outright rejection. They are what might be called “up stream” objections since   they 
occur even before we consider the main proposals.  The first objection echoes a 
similar one long ago made by Durkheim but it has been reformulated more recently 
by Justin Barrett (2004) when he points out that it is odd to account for such a central 
phenomena in the history of mankind as religion in terms of minor cognitive 
malfunctions.  My second objection is that those who propose such theories forget the 
fact that anthropologists have, after countless fruitless attempts, found it impossible to 
usefully and convincingly cross-culturally isolate or define a distinct phenomenon that 
can analytically be labelled “religion”.i  The third problem with such theories is that 
they explain “religion” as a product of core knowledge or modular capacities, such as 
naïve physics, number, naïve biology and naïve psychology, all of which, with the 
possible exception of the last, we share with all our anthropoid relatives. Such a 
proposal is therefore unconvincing simply because no other animal than humans 
manifests any behaviour that is remotely like what is usually called “religion”.  This 
lack seems to also be the case for all hominids or hominims, apart from post upper 
palaeolithic modern Sapiens. In other words, the explanations that I am challenging 
account for a highly specific and general characteristic of modern Humans, what they 
call “religion”, by general factors that have existed for millions of years before the 
upper palaeolithic revolution when the phenomenon first manifested itself. 
 
 
The alternative story I propose here avoids these problems.  It argues that religious-
like phenomena in general are an inseparable part of a key adaptation unique to 
modern humans. This is the capacity to imagine other worlds, an adaptation that, I 
shall argue is the very foundation of the sociality of modern human society. This 
neurological adaptation occurred most probably only fully developed around the time 
of the upper palaeolithic revolution. 
 
The transactional and the transcendental. 
 
For heuristic reasons, a consideration of Chimpanzee society can serve as a starting 
point.  I turn towards our nearest surviving relatives in order to stress, as is so often 
the case in the evolutionary literature, a major difference between them and us.  Of 
course, we cannot assume that contemporary Chimpanzee social organisation is 
necessarily like that of early Sapiens.  There is no way to know; especially since the 
social organisation of the two extant species of chimpanzees are radically different 
though both are equally closely, or equally remotely, related to us.  In this case it is 
not similarity but difference that is revealing and this difference provides us with 
something like a thought experiment that enables us to reflect on certain 
characteristics of human society.  
 
Chimpanzees do not have anything which remotely resembles the many and varied 
phenomena which have been labelled religion in anthropology.  Indeed this was 
probably also true of early Sapiens.  But, more importantly, there is also something 
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else that Chimpanzees, and probably early Sapiens, do not have. This is social roles or 
social groups, understood in one particular sense of the word social. 
 
Of course chimpanzee social organisation is highly complex.  For example, the 
dominant animal is not necessarily the biggest or the one who can hit hardest.  
Dominance seems to be achieved as much by Machiavellian politicking as it is by 
biting.  Secondly, chimpanzees do create long lasting coalitions, often of females, and 
these may well dominate the social organisation of the group (de Waal: 2000). Such 
roles and groupings are of a type that I call here the transactional social.  This is 
because such roles and groups are the product of a process of continual manipulation, 
assertions and defeats. This type of social is also found in modern humans. 
 
However, what the chimps do not have is the kind of phenomenon that used to be 
referred to as  “social structure” in the heyday of British social anthropology 
(Radcliffe-Brown: 1952). This I shall label here the transcendental social.  The 
transcendental social consists of essentialised roles and essentialised groups. 
 
Essentialised roles exist separately from the individual who holds them. Rights and 
duties apply to the role and not to the individual.  Thus a person who is a professor 
should act “as a professor” irrespective of the kind of person she is at any particular 
stage in the transactional social game.  Similarly, in central Madagascar, as a younger 
brother, I should walk behind my older brother; as a woman I should not raise my 
voice in a mixed gathering. All this applies, however powerful I have actually 
become, even if my prestige is greater than that of my older brother or of a man  
 
Essentialised groups exist in the sense that a descent group or a nation exists.  These 
groups have phenomenal existence not because the members of the descent group or 
the nation are doing certain kinds of thing together at particular moments, or because 
they have been together doing certain kind of things at particular moments in the 
sufficiently recent past so that it is reasonable to assume that they retain the capacity 
to behave now in similar ways.  One can be a member of an essentialised 
transcendental group, or a nation, even though one never comes in contact with the 
other members of the descent group or the nation. One can accept that others are 
members of such groups irrespective of the kind of relationship one has had with them 
or that one can suppose one is likely to have with them. Such groups are, to use 
Benedict Anderson’s phrase, “imagined communities”  (Andersen: 1983).  
 
As noted above, in stressing the system of essentialised roles and groups I am 
emphasising what British social anthropologists, such as Radcliffe-Brown, were 
referring to when they spoke of “social structure”. However, my position is 
theoretically very different from theirs.  For them the human social was equated with 
the network of such roles and groups. For me these phenomena are only a part of the 
social: they are the transcendental social.  
 
The transcendental social is not all there is to human sociality.  There is plenty of 
transactional social in human sociality that occurs side by side, or in combination 
with, the transcendental social.  The transactional social exists irrespective of the 
role-like essentialised statuses and the essentialised groups of the transcendental 
social though it may use the existence of the transcendental social as one of the many 
counters used in the transactional game. Human sociality is thus, as Durkheim 
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stressed, double. It has its transactional elements and its transcendental element. 
Chimpanzee sociality, by contrast, is single because the transcendental social does not 
exist among the chimpanzees. 
 
The double character of the human social can be illustrated by the example of a 
Malagasy village elder I have known for a long time.  By now, he is old, physically 
weak and a little bit senile. He has difficulty in recognising people.  He spends most 
of his days in a foetal position wrapped up in a blanket.  Yet he is treated with 
continual deference, consideration, respect and even fear.  Whenever there is a ritual 
to be performed he has to be put in charge so that he can bless the participants.   When 
he is treated with great respect he is being behaved to, and he accordingly behaves 
towards others as a transcendental elder. This does not mean, however, that he is not 
also within the transactional social system.  While as a transcendental elder he is 
little different to what he was when he was in his prime several years ago, as a 
transactional player he has lost out completely in the machiavellian game of influence 
and nobody takes much notice of him anymore or of his opinions since in the 
continual power play of daily life he has become insignificant. 
 
This kind of duality is impossible in Chimpanzee society.  There, once you are weak 
or, have lost out in the continual wheeling and dealings of power you lose previous 
status.  In an instant, a dominant animal is replaced in his role (De Waal 2000). 
Chimpanzee rank depends entirely on what those you interact with believe you can do 
next.  Chimpanzees do pay respect to each other in all sorts of ways… for instance, 
bowing to a dominant animal, but, once this animal has lost out in the power game, 
this behaviour stops instantly.  A social position in chimpanzee society never 
transcends the predictable achievements of the individual. This absence of 
transcendental roles is where the fundamental difference between chimpanzee and 
human sociability lies.  The Malagasy in the village where this elder lives bow to him 
just as much now that he is weak as they ever did, even though he has become 
obviously without transactional influence. It is important to remember however, that 
the respect shown him does not mean that he is an elder all the time.  The people, who 
interact with him, and probably himself, represent him in two ways.  These two ways 
are not experienced as contradictory but they are clearly distinguished and made 
visible by the behaviour of all concerned.  Everybody knows that he is a weak old 
man whose hands shake and whose memory is going and people sometimes behave 
towards him in terms of that representation, even with occasional cruelty. They also 
behave towards him in terms of the respect described above.  Thus he belongs to two 
networks and, although the two are different, the transcendental network is taken into 
account in the transactional network while the transactional network affects the 
transcendental network only indirectly; for example, when another person is 
ultimately able to replace an elder in his transcendental role through revolutionary 
manipulation (For example in a traditional African society, convincing people that he 
is a witch (Middleton: 1960)).  
 
In order to fully understand the role of an elder such as the one I have in mind, it is 
essential also to remember that, as a transcendental being, he is part of something that 
appears as a system, even though this sytematicity may be something of an illusion.   
The transcendental elder implies the existence of transcendental juniors, of 
transcendental affines, transcendental grandchildren, etc.   The transcendental network 
involves gender roles, thereby creating transcendental women and men. It is a system 
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of interrelated roles and it is this complex of inter-relations at the transcendental level 
that most critically distinguishes the human social from the sociality of other species.  
 
This transcendental network also includes what the structural functionalists called 
“corporate groups” but which I have referred to above as essentialised groups.  These 
are transcendental groups.  By this I mean that, for example, members of a clan are 
dual. At the transactional level they differ from each other just as much, or just as 
little as they do from people of the next clan.  But, in the transcendental social mode, 
all members of such a group are identical as transcendental members.  They are, as is 
often said; “one body”.  As “one body” they differ absolutely, and all in the same 
way, from those others in the other clan.  The transcendental character of such groups 
is made all the more evident when we realise that the composition of such groups, 
whether they be clans or nations, may equally include the living and the dead. Thus, 
when in the transcendental “one body” mode, members can make such bizarre 
statements as “We came to this country two hundred years ago”.  The transcendental 
can thus negate the empirically based transactional in which people do not live for 
two hundred years.  Thus, the transactional social can as much ignore the present 
physical state of an elder as it can ignore death and individuality.  The transcendental 
network can with no problem include the dead, ancestors and gods as well as living 
role holders and members of essentialised groups.  Ancestors and gods are compatible 
with living elders or members of nations because all are equally mysterious invisible, 
in other words: transcendental.  
 
The transcendental social and “religion”.  
 
This social indissoluble unity between the living and the dead and between what is 
often called the “religious” and what is often called the “social” has never been better 
explained than in a famous article by Igor Kopytoff “Ancestors as Elders in Africa” 
(Kopytoff 1971).  Although the article is phrased as a criticism of earlier work by 
Fortes it actually follows the latter author closely.  Kopytoff points out how in many 
African languages the same word is used for living elders and for dead ancestors who, 
it has often been said in the literature, Africans “worship”.  This is because in a sense, 
in the transcendental sense, they are the same kind of beings.  Kopytoff stresses how 
both ancestors and elders have much the same powers of blessing and cursing.  This 
leads him to assert that, to talk of “ancestor worship”, and thereby to suggest 
something analogous to an Abrahamic notion of a distinction between material beings 
and spiritual beings, is an ethnocentric representation which imposes our categorical 
opposition between the natural and the supernatural, or between the “real” and the 
“religious”, onto people for whom the contrast does not exist. 
 
I accept much of Kopytoff’s and Fortes’ argument and I want to expand it.  What 
matters here, is that, if they are right there is no reason why we can’t reverse his 
argument, something that Kopytoff himself suggests.  If dead ancestors, in an 
“ancestor worshiping society” are the same ontological phenomena as elders, then 
elders have the same ontological status as ancestors.  If there is a type of phenomena 
that merits the appellation “ancestor worship”, which suggests the kind of things that 
have often been called “religion”, then there is also elder worship or elder “religion”.  
And since elders are part of a system, there is, in the traditional way the term has been 
used, junior “religion”, descent group “religion”, man “religion”, woman “religion”, 
etc. 
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Although to talk in this way may be fun we have to use our words with the meanings 
that they have historically acquired.  So it might be better to rephrase the point and 
say that what has been referred to above as the transcendental social and phenomena 
that we have ethnocentrically called religion are part and parcel of a single unity. This 
implies that the English word “religion”, inevitably carrying with it the history of 
Christianity, is misleading for understanding such phenomena as ancestor worship 
since, in such cases, there is not the same boundary between the “supernatural” and 
the “natural” as that perceived to occur in societies caught in the history of the 
Abrahamic religions.  The boundary exists also in these cases, however, and it occurs 
between one type of social (the transcendental social including the phenomena that 
have been called religion) and the transactional social. This boundary is clear in the 
kind of society I am referring to and explains the two different ways of acting towards 
the Malagasy elder noted above. 
   
The inseparability of the transcendental social and the religious is not only manifest in 
cases of so-called “ancestor worship”.   Hinduism is a phenomenon that is often 
assumed to be comparable with the Abrahamic religions but such an equation is 
misleading for the same reasons as apply to the African examples discussed above.  
For example, Fuller begins his study of popular Hinduism by pointing out that a wife 
should, and indeed does, at some moments, treat her husband in the same way as she 
treats the gods.  The same gestures and bodily positions are used in both cases in 
performing puja and the husband can thus be said to be a “god” to his wife in the 
Hindu sense of god. The point is that here also the transcendental social husband and 
wife role is part of one single overarching transcendental hierarchical social system 
that includes the gods (Fuller 1992).  
 
 
The societies I have discussed above clearly present a challenge for the kind of 
theories referred to at the beginning of this article, that is the theories advocated by, 
among others, Boyer.  This is because they explain a phenomenon that can only be 
distinguished from a greater whole: the transcendental social, by using a contrast 
between the religious and the secular that is borrowed from a relatively modern 
system of representations that simply does not apply in their cases.  Consequently I 
shall argue that it is the greater whole in its totality, i.e. the transcendental, that needs 
to be explained.  However, such a redefinition of the project presents an obvious 
difficulty.  If Boyer is wrong to take a specific type of society, those with “religion”, 
to represent the human condition in general, is it not equally wrong to take specific 
other societies, those discussed in this paper so far, as representing human nature?   
 
Historical excursions. 
 
In what follows I argue that this is not so because societies with “religion” are the 
subsequent product of an inessential and superficial modification of the societies 
discussed above. A full demonstration of this point would require much more space 
than is available in this short paper.  What follows is therefore nothing more than a 
tentative sketch of what such a proposal would look like.   So, in order to explain how 
a certain state of affairs occurred for some, and only some, human groups I move to a 
historical argument to argue that it is in certain specific historical circumstances 
(admittedly of great importance for the majority of mankind though not for all) that 
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the kind of phenomena we call “religious” take on a separate appearance that seems to 
distinguish it from the more inclusive transcendental social.   
 
The creation of an apparently separate “religion” is closely tied to the history of the 
state. It has long been noted that in early states such a Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, 
the early Andean states and many other places that the  “religious” and the “political” 
were inseparable.  Frankfort long ago argued that in ancient Egypt pharaoh was a 
visible god interacting on a compatible footing with the invisible gods. The 
organisation of the state was part of the divine order (Frankfort: 1948).  The ancient 
Egyptian kingdom was part of an explicit cosmic ordering of space and time.  The 
recurrence of the flooding of the Nile was represented as the consequence of the 
repetitive cyclic action of the gods, including the pharaoh. The world was centred on 
the capital with distant uncivilised, barely human, peripheral peoples far from its 
centre.  Egypt was, to borrow the Chinese phrase, the empire of the centre.  All this is 
the familiar attribute of what has been called divine kingship, whether it is that of the 
Swazi, Indic states or the Mesopotamian city-states.  
 
The transcendental representation of such states was not all there was to political 
organisation. There were also other available transactional representations of the state, 
pharaoh, time and space. In much the same way as the Malagasy elder is dual it was 
also possible to see the pharaoh in more straightforward terms, and that was in spite of 
the prodigious efforts that were made to transform him through his palace and his 
tomb into an empirical manifestation of his transcendental side.  
 
The transcendental construction of such states is also accompanied by another 
corollary process.   The development of the Merina state in Madagascar in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century shows how the construction of the symbolic state is 
accompanied by a partial destruction and reformulation of the symbolism of the 
subjects.   Thus, certain key attributes of elders/ancestors were forcibly transferred 
from local descent groups to the king and his palace (Bloch 1986).  Interestingly, a 
similar process involving the diminution of the transcendental social of subjects for 
the benefit and construction of the royal transcendental has been examined for early 
Egypt by David Wengrow (2006). 
 
Thus the royal centralised transcendental construction depends on the partial 
destruction or at least transformation of the symbolical system of subjects. In 
Madagascar the focus of the symbolism of the subjects migrated, thanks to violent 
encouragement, from the house to the tomb, as the palace became the symbolical 
house of the kingdom with the ruler as its central “post” (in Malagasy Andry the root 
of the word for ruler Andriana: lord)  (Bloch 1995).  Similarly, and in more detail, I 
described how the descent group ritual of circumcision subsequently became 
orchestrated by the state and how certain aspects were taken away from the elders to 
become constitutive elements of grand state occasions.  The descent groups lost key 
elements to the representative of the state and were punished if they attempted to 
perform the full ritual independently (Bloch 1986).    
 
Since in such systems the transcendental social and the religious are identical it is not 
just the religious that is being reorganised in a centralised state and sucked up to a 
point into a centralised, organised, organic-seeming system, it is the whole 
transcendental social.  The creation of this transcendental holistic image of the 
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complete kingdom, including gods and men, thus requires the creation of the 
incompleteness and disorganisation of the subjects’ transcendental social which can 
only be made complete in the kingdom. 
 
After such a process, a change that is different to the symbolic centralisation of the 
state, happens.  States are unstable and political systems continually collapse.  That 
causes a new problem. When the royal state collapses at the hand of its enemies the 
subjects find themselves bereft because the construction of the state had previously 
made them transcendentally incomplete and the state, after its collapse, is not there 
anymore to complete them. 
 
The same Malagasy example can again illustrate this point.  The growth of the Merina 
kingdom in the nineteenth century had led to the circumcision ritual being partly 
taken out of the transcendental construction of descent groups and being placed in the 
realm of the symbolical construction of the kingdom.  However in 1868, when the 
Merina kingdom became disorganised, in part because of the influence of 
Christianity, the ruler failed to perform the royal circumcision ritual.  At that point a 
popular movement arose which sought to force him to perform it. 
 
Why did the subjects feel bereft by the royal non-performance when originally the 
ritual had been their privilege?  Why should they seek the state that in many ways 
exploited them?  Because, given the previous process, when the state collapsed, they 
were left with nothing but their incomplete transcendental social and, for reasons that 
I cannot explain, it seems as if the deprivation process is irreversible.  Thus, when the 
state, having confiscated a large part of the transcendental social so as to create its 
own ordered pseudo totality of cosmic order, then collapsed, a totalising 
transcendental representation without its political foundation remained, floating in 
mid air, so to speak. This begins to look like what we call “religion”. For example, the 
collapse of the political base of the transcendental social may lead to the occurrence 
of these ritual, sacred, pseudo-royal systems of Africa that so fascinated Frazer, where 
as Evans-Pritchard said, the king “reigns but does not rule” (Evans-Pritchard: 1948).  
It is what leads to shadow “states” which only exist in mystical form as spirits that 
possess mediums. Examples of these are found among the Shona or in Western 
Madagascar where they were caused, Feeley-Harnik argues, by the collapse of the 
political as a consequence of colonial rule (Feeley-Harnik: 1991).  This is also what 
explains the bizarre institutions of contemporary European monarchies.  These post-
state “states” are  “religions”, that is phenomena apparently distinct from the rest of 
the transcendental social. 
 
The Abrahamic religions offer another example of the process. The historian of 
Judaism and of early Christianity J.Z. Smith argues that Jewish monotheism must be 
understood as the product of a longing for the unified, centralised, holistic 
transcendental Mesopotamian city-states with Ziggurats at their centre.  These were a 
kind of state that the Jews, as minor peripherals to that system, hardly ever managed 
to achieve for themselves, or, when they did, did so on a tiny fragile scale. Early 
Judaism is therefore also a transcendental incomplete residue: religion.  This residue 
was modelled on the Mesopotamian prototype with at its centre the Ziggurat in a 
purely “religious” form, that is the temple in Jerusalem (Smith: 1982).  
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With this sort of situation we therefore get religions, which are only apparently 
separate from the transcendental social state, but this separation is always 
uncomfortable and unfinished and it leads to the kind of flirting processes between 
state and religion that has characterised history in much of the Abrahamic world. At 
least in Europe and those great sways of Asia and Africa that are still under the 
ghostly spell of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt.  This flirting takes various forms.  
One form of the process involves new states taking on, ready made, one of these 
politically detached religions issued from clearly different political entities.  Rome 
was an example of the process.  Imperial Rome became one of these centralised 
systems where political conquest led to the creation of a transcendental social 
representation of the state through making incomplete the transcendental social of 
subjects.  Yet the transcendental construction never worked very well and when Rome 
got into even more trouble than usual the system broke down.  This led to the 
adoption of foreign and abandoned centre-religions, therefore “hungry” for the 
recovery of their lost politico/transcendental social element, for example: Judaism, 
other Eastern “religions”, and, ultimately, one of the many forms of Christianity.  
Rome was therefore taking on the religious side of a centralised system from a 
collapsed tiny city-state as a late attempt at reorganisation of a unified transcendental 
(Beard et al: 1998). 
 
The process repeated itself.  When, in the seventh century, the Franks began to 
develop centralised entities in Western Europe they picked up Christianity and, so to 
speak, “put it on” with modifications to make it fit.   One of the most spectacular 
moments was when Charlemagne in 800 invented a ritual which made him the Holy 
Roman Emperor with bits borrowed from the old testament, from Frankish rituals and 
of course, above all, from Roman rituals (Nelson 1987) . 
 
The other form of the relation between religion and the state, made necessary by their 
previous separation as a result of the collapse of a centralised unit, is for the religious 
bit to try to grow back its lost political undercarriage. Again and again, the popes 
tried. The Ayatollah Khomeini was more successful. Most of the movements that 
have been called millenarians try this sort of thing. Mormon history furnishes a 
particularly interesting example.  Joseph Smith started the Mormon religion in the 
eastern United States for people who were heirs to a Christian religion that at many 
removes was heir to a long history of trouble between the religious like pretensions of 
the state and the state like pretensions of religion.  However, the Mormons were, in a 
place where the state was weak, and, unusually, where the totalising cosmological 
pretensions of post state religion were strikingly incoherent, largely because they were 
meant to apply to a country not included in the cosmology of the Bible. So the 
Mormons put that to right by finding a Gospel that did mention the new world and its 
inhabitants and, in their creative enthusiasm, began to rebuild the political part of the 
destroyed transcendental entity.  Not surprisingly this annoyed the other state in 
Washington and they had to try to build it up in the desert, which, amazingly, they 
just about succeeded in doing.  At the centre of this renewed unitary entity, where the 
transcendental social and religious were again to be an inseparable totality as in 
ancient Egypt or Mesopotamia, they built their temple; a temple that looks strikingly 
like a Ziggurat. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
 9
The point of these historical excursions is to suggest that the separation of religion 
from the transcendental social in general is, even in the places where it appears at first 
to exist, superficial and transient. In any case, this superficial phenomenon has 
occurred in human history only relatively recently.   
 
It is this transcendental social in its totality that should be our focus.  It is what 
distinguishes the human social from that of other closely related animals, such as 
Chimpanzees. It is an essential characteristic and a unique part of that special human 
sociality, which many have suggested, is the fundamental difference between humans 
and other anthropoids. An explanation of its occurrence cannot thus be in terms of a 
minor evolutionary adaptation, or miss-adaptation, as is suggested by Boyer type 
theories. 
 
Such a conclusion is negative, but it is possible to propose a more positive and fruitful 
one.   
 
What the transcendental social requires is the ability to live very largely in 
imagination. We often act towards elders, kings, mothers, etc. not in terms of how 
they appear to the senses at any particular moment but as if they were something else: 
essential transcendental beings. Once we realise this omnipresence of the imaginary in 
the everyday nothing special is left to explain concerning “religion”. What needs to be 
explained is the much more general question how it is that we can act so much of the 
time towards visible people in terms of their invisible halo. The tool for this 
fundamental operation is the capacity for imagination.  It is while searching for 
neurological evidence for the development of this capacity and of its social 
implications that we, in passing, will account for religious-like phenomena.  Trying to 
understand how imagination can account for the transcendental social, and 
incidentally “religion” is a quite different enterprise to accounting for the religious for 
itself in terms of modules, or core knowledge, which, in any case, we share with other 
primates. Unlike these imagination does seem to distinguish us from Chimpanzees 
and perhaps also distinguishes post upper palaeolithic humans from their forebears.   
 
A number of recent writers have suggested something along the same lines. In a book 
by Paul Harris about imagination, the author shows how the ability to engage 
spontaneously in pretend play begins very young and develops in a multitude of ways 
such as creating “imaginary friends” and other forms of explicit make believe. Such 
imagination practice seems essential for normal human development.  Nothing like 
that occurs in other species.  Clearly this capacity is necessary for engaging in the 
transcendental social as defined above, inevitably including the religious-like. The 
selective advantage this form of sociality procures explains its evolutionary potential. 
It is central to human life.  Harris suggests this centrality in an adventurous 
introduction when he notes that the first evidence for such a capacity is the cave 
paintings of Europe dating back to around 40,000 years ago (Harris: 2000).  He might 
have gone a bit further back, to what has been called the upper palaeolithic revolution; 
one feature of which was the first suggestion of transcendental roles found in grand 
burial. 
 
Again, in a parallel argument, also taking empirical data on ontological development 
as its starting point, Hannes Rakoczy connects imagination and the transcendental 
social even more explicitly (Rakoczy: 2007) In that work, and that of his co-workers, 
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this is referred to as “status functions” but it is as yet little developed.  However the 
argument is strikingly similar to that proposed above and totally congruent. It does not 
however, like Harris, touch on the topic of “religion”, but according to my argument, 
this is inevitably subsumed under this type of discussion of the social.   
 
 
To explain religion is therefore a fundamentally misguided enterprise. It is rather like 
trying to explain the function of headlights while ignoring what motorcars are like and 
for. What needs to be explained is the nature of human sociability and then religion 
simply appears as an aspect of this that cannot stand alone.  Unfortunately the recent 
general discussion on social cognition does not succeed in doing the job that is needed 
to understand the transcendental social either.  This is because, for the most part, it 
has considered the human social as an elaboration and an expansion of the type of 
social found in other animals, especially other primates (Dunbar: 2004). This is useful 
but it obscures a fundamental difference between humans and others.  Such an 
approach only pays attention to the transactional, or the “machiavellian” social, since 
that is what is shared by, for example, baboons and humans.  It ignores the uniquely 
human transcendental social that represents a qualitative difference with other non-
human socialities.  What is essential to understand is the evolution of this specificity.   
Concentrating on that equally unique human capacity imagination seems the most 
fruitful approach in hat enterprise and, in passing, we will also account for religion 
since it is nothing special.  
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i Boyer insists that he is not talking about religion in the usual sense but he does not define what he is 
talking about and he has no problem in entitling his books: The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: a 
Cognitive Theory of Religion  and  Religion Explained.
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